

## Message Text

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43 40

ORIGIN EA-09

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SS-15 IO-10 CCO-00 SSO-00 /045 R

DRAFTED BY EA/VN:DCHARR:JCM

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P 281546Z AUG 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 204932 TOSEC 100255

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, UN, VS, VN, LA, CB

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: TREATMENT OF VIETNAMESE,  
LAOTIAN AND CAMBODIAN UN DELEGATIONS (S/S 7517065 )

FOR THE SECRETARY THRU SISCO, FROM HABIB

SUMMARY: THIS ACTION MEMO REQUESTS DECISIONS ON TREATMENT  
OF THE UN DELEGATIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM, LAOS  
AND CAMBODIA. WE RECOMMEND THAT OVERTURES FROM EITHER  
VIETNAMESE DELEGATION BE RESPONDED TO AND THAT CHANNELS  
BETWEEN USUN AND THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATIONS BE  
AT THE ADVISOR FIRST SECRETARY) LEVEL. THIS LEVEL  
WOULD ALLOW DISCUSSION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND  
MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY IN OUR RELATIONS WITH VIET-NAM. FOR  
CAMBODIA, WE RECOMMEND RESPONDING TO CONTACTS AT WHATEVER  
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LEVEL THEY ARE OFFERED AND TO TAKE A NON-POLEMIC POSTURE  
IN REBUTTING ANY CAMBODIA ATTACKS. THIS WOULD KEEP  
MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED IN  
OPENING CONTACTS WITH THE CAMBODIANS AND TO EXPLOIT ANY

DIFFERENCES THAT MAY ARISE BETWEEN THE CAMBODIANS AND VIETNAMESE. SINCE LAOS MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., WE RECOMMEND RESPONDING TO LAO INITIATIVES UP TO AND INCLUDING THE HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL. THIS

WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY OF MAINTAINING A NORMAL, IF MODEST, LEVEL OF RELATIONS WITH THE PGNU.  
END SUMMARY.

#### 1. PROBLEM

WE NEED TO DECIDE HOW WE WILL CONDUCT OUR RELATIONS IN NEW YORK WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF NORTH VIET-NAM, THE NEW REGIMES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA, WHETHER WE WILL APPLY TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS TO THEM, AND WHETHER WE WISH TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN OUR RELATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF LAOS.

#### 2. BACKGROUND

BOTH VIET-NAMS HAVE OBSERVER DELEGATIONS AT NEW YORK. PHNOM PENH HAS SERVED NOTICE THAT IT INTENDS TO OCCUPY THE CAMBODIAN UN SEAT. WE THINK SIHANOUK MAY ATTEND THE SESSION BUT HAVE NO FIRM INFORMATION ON THIS. THE LAO UN DELEGATION REMAINS UNCHANGED: THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER WILL PROBABLY COME TO NEW YORK FOR THE GENERAL DEBATE. WE HAVE MADE NO DECISION ON RECOGNIZING THE PRESENT REGIMES IN NORTH VIET-NAM, SOUTH VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA BUT WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT WE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA ASSUMING THE SEATS OF THE PREDECESSOR GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES. OUR RECENT VETO OF THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM WILL BE A POINT OF FRICTION IN ANY CONTACTS WE MIGHT WISH TO SET UP WITH THOSE TWO STATES.

#### 3. ISSUES

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CONTACTS - GENERAL US POLICY AT NEW YORK

THE PATTERN OF CONTACT IN NEW YORK IN THE PAST WITH GOVERNMENTS OR MOVEMENTS THAT WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE HAS FOLLOWED ONE OF TWO APPROACHES.

-- THE FIRST IS TO LIMIT CONTACT TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO DISCUSS BUSINESS ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR PRESENCE AT THE UN, AS REQUIRED BY THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT. SUCH BUSINESS IS CONDUCTED FROM OUR SIDE BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION OF USUN. NORTH KOREA IS AN EXAMPLE OF A STATE TREATED IN THIS FASHION.

-- THE SECOND APPROACH IS TO PERMIT INFORMAL CONTACT  
AT SOME DESIGNATED LEVEL

THIS TYPE OF INFORMAL LIAISON IS MAINTAINED BY

USUN WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. A  
VARIATION OF THIS APPROACH IS TO DESIGNATE A SPECIFIC  
U.S. OFFICIAL TO MAINTAIN FORMAL CONTACT ON SPECIFIC  
ISSUES ON SPECIFIC OCCASIONS, AS WAS DONE EARLIER IN  
OUR RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA.

#### 4. CONTACTS WITH THE VIET-NAMS

SINCE THE 1973 PARIS AGREEMENTS, OUR EMBASSY IN  
PARIS HAS HAD CONTACT WITH THE DRV EMBASSY IN PARIS AT  
THE FIRST SECRETARY LEVEL ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS ON  
SPECIFIC ISSUES. THE USG HAS REFRAINED FROM ANY DIRECT  
DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH THE PRG. WE HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED  
TO EXPAND OR ELEVATE OUR CONTACTS WITH EITHER THE DRV  
OR THE PRG SINCE THE FALL OF SAIGON.

SINCE THE FALL OF SAIGON, HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT  
DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE NEW REGIME IN THE  
SOUTH IN ADDRESSING SUCH QUESTIONS AS MEMBERSHIP IN  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND VISAS FOR OBSERVER  
DELEGATIONS. WE HAVE AVOIDED PUBLICLY JUDGING WHETHER  
OR NOT SOUTH VIET-NAM IS INDEPENDENT AND HAVE CHOSEN NOT  
TO OPPOSE THE STRONG INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT TO RECOGNIZE  
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THE PRG AND TO ADMIT IT TO SPECIALIZED UN AGENCIES.  
IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS APPROACH TO ACCEPT  
DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH THE PRG AT THE SAME LEVEL AS  
WITH THE DRV. THIS COULD BE PRESENTED AS "DEALING  
WITH THE VIETNAMESE" RATHER THAN AS RECOGNIZING THE PRG.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN THE  
U.S. AND THE TWO VIET-NAMS: "NORMALIZATION" OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; ECONOMIC RELATIONS; POW'S AND  
MIA'S; AND THE REPATRIATION OF OUR RESPECTIVE NATIONALS.  
THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE VIETNAMESE MAY BE  
PREPARING INITIATIVES ON SOME ISSUES: THEY ARE  
BEGINNING TO ADDRESS THE RELEASE OF EIGHT AMERICANS  
CAPTURED AT BAN ME THUOT LAST MARCH, AND THE PRG INVITED  
AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES TO MEET IN SINGAPORE IN  
SEPTEMBER.

BASIC U.S. INTEREST APPEARS TO BE TO MAINTAIN MAXIMUM  
FLEXIBILITY IN KEEPING OPEN CHANNELS OF CONTACT WITH  
THE VIETNAMESE STATES IN ANTICIPATION OF APPROACHES ON ONE  
OR MORE OF THESE ISSUES. IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT OUR  
PRELIMINARY DECISIONS ON THE LEVEL AND STYLE OF  
CONTACTS WITH THE DRV AND PRG IN NEW YORK MAY HAVE TO BE

REVISED IN THE LIGHT OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS.

SHOULD THE VIETNAMESE MAKE PRELIMINARY GESTURES -- SUCH AS RELEASING OF DETAINED AMERICANS -- OR APPROACH US AT THE UN, WE MIGHT RESPOND BY OPENING A REGULAR CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION IN NEW YORK, PERHAPS AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN THE CHANNEL IN PARIS. RESPONDING TO APPROACHES IN NEW YORK AT THE ADVISOR (FIRST SECRETARY EQUIVALENT) OR LOWER LEVEL WOULD SIGNAL OUR DESIRE NOT TO ELEVATE OUR RELATIONS AND AFFECT THE PARIS CHANNEL TO A LESSER DEGREE. AT THE OTHER EXTREME, REBUFFING APPROACHES IN NEW YORK WOULD PROBABLY BE VIEWED BY THE VIETNAMESE AS UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES.

#### 5. CONTACTS WITH CAMBODIA

WE HAVE HAD NO FORMAL OR INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH THE PRESENT REGIME IN CAMBODIA, WITH WHOM, UNLIKE NORTH CONFIDENTIAL

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AND SOUTH VIET-NAM, WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION. WE CAN EXPECT CONSIDERABLE PRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST (SENATOR MANSFIELD IN PARTICULAR) IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE CAMBODIANS, ESPECIALLY IF SIHANOUK HEADS THE CAMBODIAN DELEGATION, BECAUSE OF THE NOVELTY OF THEIR APPEARANCE HERE AND THE FACT THAT SUCH CONTACTS WILL BE THE FIRST BETWEEN US. INTEREST WILL ALSO BE STIRRED BY REPORTED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIANS, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THEIR IMPLICITLY ANTI-VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE DURING KHIEU SAMPHAN'S RECENT PEKING VISIT. ALL THIS ARGUES FOR A POLICY OF MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN OUR HANDLING OF CONTACTS WITH THE CAMBODIANS AND IN HOW WE MAY WISH TO USE THE UNGA SESSION TO SET THE TONE FOR OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THEM. IT IS IN U.S. INTEREST TO EXPLOIT ANY DIFFERENCES THAT MAY ARISE BETWEEN THE CAMBODIANS AND THE VIETNAMESE.

#### 6. CONTACTS WITH LAOS

THE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH LAOS HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS, AND OUR CONTACTS IN NEW YORK MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THIS CONTEXT. SINCE WE STILL MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE PGNU, CONTACTS CAN PROBABLY PROCEED AS WE CHOOSE, IN A MORE NORMAL FASHION THAN WITH EITHER THE VIETNAMESE OR CAMBODIANS. WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC ISSUES TO DISCUSS WITH THE LAO IN THIS PARTICULAR FORUM; THEY MAY USE ANY CONTACTS TO PRESS FOR A NEW AID AGREEMENT, WHICH WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER AT THIS TIME. LAOS STILL MAINTAINS ITS EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON, AND THIS WOULD AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE CHANNEL FOR NON UN BUSINESS.

## 7. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

WITH GOVERNMENTS WE RECOGNIZE (USSR, PRC, AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES) TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ARE GENERALLY BASED ON RECIPROCITY. WITH UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS OR MOVEMENTS, TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ARE DESIGNED USUALLY TO SHOW RELATIVE FAVOR OR DISFAVOR. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A GUIDE IN THE CASE OF LAOS BUT NOT CONFIDENTIAL

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FOR THE OTHER THREE STATES.

TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS LIMIT THE DISTANCE FROM NEW YORK CITY IN WHICH TRAVEL IS PERMITTED, INDICATE TRAVEL IS PERMITTED, INDICATE POINTS OF ENTRANCE INTO THE COUNTRY, AND DESIGNATE HOW EXCEPTIONS TO THESE RESTRICTIONS CAN BE MADE. IN SOME CASES, WE REQUEST ONLY THAT THE STATE NOTIFY US OF PLANS FOR TRAVEL BEYOND THE RESTRICTED AREA A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME IN ADVANCE OF TRAVEL; THIS PERMITS US TO DENY PARTICULAR TRAVEL IF WE SO DESIRE. IN OTHER CASES, WE REQUIRE THAT TRAVEL BEYOND THE RESTRICTED AREA BE SPECIFICALLY GRANTED IN EACH CASE.

RESTRICTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN IMPOSED UPON THE TWO VIETNAMESE OBSERVER DELEGATIONS CONFINING THEM TO A 25 MILE RADIUS OF MANHATTAN -- THE SAME AS THOSE APPLYING TO NORTH KOREA -- WE RECOMMEND NO CHANGE BE MADE TO THESE RESTRICTIONS PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN RELATIONS WITH THESE TWO STATES.

## 8. OPTIONS -- NORTH VIET-NAM

### OPTION 1

-- TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN APPROACHING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US AT THE HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL, AS INSTRUCTED BY THE DEPARTMENT. THIS WOULD SIGNAL TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE A READINESS TO MAKE MAJOR STEPS TOWARDS DISCUSSING OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AS WELL AS A WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON THEIR ISSUES, SUCH AS GRANTING OF RECONSTRUCTION AID TO VIET-NAM AND IMPROVEMENT OF GENERAL POLITICAL RELATIONS.

### OPTION 2

-- APPROACH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON A LIMITED RANGE OF ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US AT THE ADVISOR (FIRST SECRETARY) LEVEL. THIS WOULD INDICATE OUR CONTINUING CONCERN OVER THESE MATTERS BUT WOULD NOT BE A DE FACTO ELEVATION OF THE LEVEL OF OUR RELATIONS BEYOND THE FIRST

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SECRETARY LEVEL CONTACTS WE HAVE IN PARIS.

OPTION 3

-- TAKE NO INITIATIVES IN APPROACHING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OURSELVES, BUT BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE ANY INITIATIVES TAKEN BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AT ANY LEVEL. RESPONSES TO THESE APPROACHES WOULD THEN BE MADE AT A LEVEL APPROPRIATE TO THE ISSUE INVOLVED. THIS APPROACH WOULD MAINTAIN OUR OPPENNESS BUT ALSO INDICATE THAT THE U.S. IS NOT PRESSING FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN BOTH THE GENERAL STATE OF OUR RELATIONS AND IN THESE SPECIFIC ISSUES.

OPTION 4

-- DECLINE ANY APPROACHES BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, REFERRING THEM TO THE EXISTING CHANNELS IN PARIS. THIS APPROACH WOULD INDICATE U.S. DESIRE TO KEEP RELATIONS AT PRECISELY THE CURRENT LEVEL AND A LACK OF INTEREST IN ENLARGING OR EXPANDING DISCUSSIONS OF THE VARIOUS ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

9. OPTIONS -- SOUTH VIET-NAM

OPTION 1

-- HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WHATSOEVER WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE, IN SUPPORT OF OUR CONTENTION THAT THE PRG IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

OPTION 2

-- ACCEPT THE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH SOUTH VIET-NAM UP TO THE LEVEL BUT NOT HIGHER THAN THOSE ESTABLISHED WITH NORTH VIET-NAM, IN THE EVENT THAT THE VIETNAMESE MAY WISH TO USE THE PRG CHANNEL FOR DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN BASICALLY "SOUTHERN ISSUES". THIS APPROACH RUNS THE DANGER OF GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PRG AS A SEPARATE STATE BUT MAY PROVIDE THE ONLY DIRECT CHANNEL FOR SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN ISSUES (POW'S HELD IN THE SOUTH, OIL  
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EXPLORATION RIGHTS, ETC.)

10. OPTIONS - CAMBODIA

OPTION 1

(OPTIONS - CAMBODIA CONTINUED)

-- RESPOND TO CONTACTS AT HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL, IF AUTHORIZED BY DEPARTMENT, BUT KEEP DISCUSSIONS GENERAL AND BRIEF. ADOPT NON-POLEMICAL POSTURE IN REBUTTING ANY CAMBODIAN ATTACKS ON U.S. WITH THE VIEW OF LOOKING FORWARD EVENTUALLY TO NORMALIZING OUR RELATIONS WITH THE NEW CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT. PLACE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE ON NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM.

OPTION 2

-- RESPOND TO CONTACTS AT THE COUNSELOR LEVEL OR BELOW ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, IF AUTHORIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT. BE PREPARED TO REACT FORCEFULLY TO CAMBODIAN ATTACKS ON U.S. IN UN FORUMS, BUT NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CRITICIZING THE NEW REGIME. PLACE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE IMPOSED ON NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM.

OPTION 3

-- DISCOURAGE ANY CONTACTS -- PRIVATE OR OFFICIAL -- WITH THE CAMBODIAN DELEGATION TO DEMONSTRATE OUR DISPLEASURE WITH THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR AND OUR FORCED EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH. REACT FORCEFULLY TO CAMBODIAN ATTACKS ON US AND SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO CRITICIZE THE NEW REGIME ON SUCH MATTERS AS HUMAN RIGHTS. PLACE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE IMPOSED ON NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM.

11. OPTIONS - LAOS

OPTION 1

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-- RESPOND TO LAOTIAN INITIATIVES UP TO AND INCLUDING THE HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC UN ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE DEPARTMENT, PLUS THOSE OF A BILATERAL NATURE ON DEPARTMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS.

OPTION 2

-- RESPOND, AS IN OPTION 1, TO LAOTIAN INITIATIVES AT THE DEPUTY HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL OR BELOW (WE HAVE A CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN VIENTIANE) ON ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS:

NORTH VIET-NAM -- CONTACTS

-- BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DRV CONTACTS AT WHATEVER LEVEL THEY ARE OFFERED, BUT TO TAKE NO INITIATIVES OURSELVES PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. EA RECOMMENDS THIS. (OPTION 3)

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, REBUFF ALL NEW YORK CONTACTS EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT. (OPTION 4)

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, PREPARE AND OFFER TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE A MAJOR INITIATIVE TOWARDS NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES AT THE HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL. (OPTION 1)

APPROVE

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DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, MAKE APPROACHES TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US AT THE ADVISOR (FIRST SECRETARY) LEVEL. (OPTION 2)

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

13. SOUTH VIET-NAM - CONTACTS

-- BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AT THE SAME LEVEL AS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, OR AT A LEVEL DICTATED BY THE NATURE OF ISSUES AND THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES. (OPTION 2) EA RECOMMENDS THIS.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, CONTINUE TO REBUFF ALL DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. (OPTION 1)



APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

14. NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM -- TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

-- MAINTAIN EXISTING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRG AND DRV OBSERVER DELEGATION, LIMITING THEM TO WITHIN 25 MILES OF MANHATTAN, REQUIRING EXPLICIT PERMISSION FROM USUN FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE RESTRICTED AREA. EA RECOMMENDS THIS.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, MAINTAIN EXISTING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, CONFIDENTIAL

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BUT ONLY REQUIRE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF THE OBSERVER DELEGATION OF PROPOSED TRAVEL OUTSIDE RESTRICTED AREA.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

15. CAMBODIA

-- RESPOND TO CONTACTS AT WHATEVER LEVEL THEY ARE OFFERED IF AUTHORIZED BY DEPARTMENT. TAKE A NON-POLEMIC POSTURE IN REBUTTING CAMBODIAN ATTACKS ON THE U.S. PLACE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE ON NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM. OPTION 1). EA RECOMMENDS THIS ON GROUNDS THAT IT AFFORDS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO EXPLOIT WHATEVER OPPORTUNITIES THE UNGA MAY OFFER IN TERMS OF OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE CAMBODIANS.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, RESPOND TO CONTACTS AT COUNSELOR LEVEL OR BELOW ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. REACT TO CAMBODIAN ATTACKS ON U.S. IN THE UN. PLACE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE ON NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM. (OPTION 2).

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, DISCOURAGE ANY CONTACTS WITH THE

CAMBODIAN DELEGATION. REACT FORCEFULLY TO CAMBODIAN  
ATTACKS ON US AND SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO CRITICIZE THE  
REGIME ON SUCH ISSUES AS HUMAN RIGHTS. PLACE TRAVEL  
RESTRICTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE IMPOSED ON NORTH AND  
SOUTH VIET-NAM. (OPTION 3).

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE  
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16. LAOS

-- RESPOND TO LAO INITIATIVES UP TO AND INCLUDING THE  
HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC UN ISSUES  
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE DEPARTMENT PLUS THOSE OF A  
BILATERAL NATURE ON DEPARTMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS. YRAVEL  
RESTRICTIONS NOT TO BE IMPOSED. (OPTION 1). EA  
RECOMMENDS THIS AS CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY OF  
MAINTAINING A NORMAL, IF STILL MODEST, LEVEL OF  
RELATIONS WITH THE PGNU.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, RESPOND TO LAO INITIATIVES AT THE  
DEPUTY HEAD OF DELEGATION LEVEL OR BELOW AS IN OPTION 1.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, ESCHEW ANY CONTACTS WITH THE LAO  
DELEGATION. (OPTION 3). IMPOSE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

INGERSOLL

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**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, TOSEC, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 28 AUG 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** RowellE0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE204932  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** EA/VN:DCHARR:JCM  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
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**Line Count:** 534  
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**Office:** ORIGIN EA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 10  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** RowellE0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21 MAY 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <21 MAY 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <08 OCT 2003 by RowellE0>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PORG, VS, VN, LA, CB, UNGA  
**To:** SECRETARY  
JERUSALEM  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006